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Foreword
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federal tax division of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants to explore, comment, and, where appropriate, de
velop positions on, matters of tax policy covering major areas of
taxation in which members of the accounting profession have
special competence.
The value-added tax as a substitute for some of our present
forms of taxation has been discussed for some time and could pro
vide an additional source of federal revenue. What makes it par
ticularly interesting is the fact that numerous foreign nations have
successfully adopted a VAT system. It is intended that the formal
presentation of this study will assist members of the congressional
tax writing committees, members of the executive branch of gov
ernment, and the public in their consideration of this subject.
Statements of Tax Policy are approved by the executive com
mittee of the federal tax division after they are developed by the
division's tax policy subcommittee. In limited circumstances, other
division subcommittees may develop a policy statement if re
quested to do so. This statement was approved by the 1973-1974
tax policy subcommittee and the 1973-1974 executive committee.
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1
Basic Aspects of VAT
Introduction
Objectives and Conclusions

The purpose of this report is to study the value-added tax
(VAT) to see how it could or would be applied in the United
States.
The report considers whether an indirect tax such as a VAT
should be used to provide for significant increases in federal reve
nue in lieu of increasing direct taxes (corporate and individual
income taxes). It notes that besides providing additional revenues,
the imposition of an indirect tax in lieu of increasing direct taxes
would make U.S. goods more competitive in the world market
with goods exported by European countries that rely heavily on
an indirect tax system.
The question of whether an indirect tax should take the form
of a retail sales tax or a VAT is examined. The report concludes
that a federally administered, comprehensive retail sales tax is
the preferred choice. However, if a VAT is chosen, it should be a
single-rate consumption type covering capital purchases, with as
few exemptions as possible.
Finally, if an indirect tax is imposed at the federal level, the
report suggests that consideration should be given to placing with
the federal government the responsibility for collection and ad
ministration of similar taxes now imposed and administered at
the state level.
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Underlying all discussions of VAT are three aspects: economic,
political, and administrative. For example, the question of the
eff ect of VAT on price stability is an important economic consid
eration; its burden on consumers, a political one; and its ease or
diff i culty of collection, an administrative one. Some specifics of
these three aspects are brought out in this report together with
commentary where considered necessary or desirable.
What Is VAT?

VAT is an indirect tax—that is, it is a tax that is levied only in
directly on persons since it is levied directly on the goods and
services supplied to a person; it thus differs from a tax which is
levied directly on persons. Indirect taxes would include retail
sales taxes, excise taxes, and import duties; direct taxes would in
clude individual and corporate income taxes and inheritance taxes.
Theoretically, VAT is a tax on the value added to goods or ser
vices by each separate processor in the production and distribu
tion chain. Actually, and functionally, it is a tax on the increase
in the sales price of the goods or services as they pass through
that chain. But ultimately, it is a tax on consumption—on the
amount spent for the product by the final consumer since ulti
mately he bears the burden of the tax, even though the actual
payor of the tax to a government is the manufacturer or processor.
At its simplest, each processor collects a tax on his sales of
goods or services, deducts from the taxes as collected the amount
of taxes he has paid, and remits the difference to the government.
If he pays more tax than he collects, he receives a refund.
There are three types of VAT classified according to their
treatment of purchases of capital items—the consumption type,
the gross product type, and the income type.
The consu m ption type is the tax used in the Common Market
and is the type most frequently discussed in this country. Under
the consumption type, a purchaser of capital items is entitled to
deduct the tax paid on such items from collections of VAT just
as he does for tax paid on all other purchases.
Under the gross produ ct type, no deduction would be allowed
for tax paid on capital items; it can only be recovered by the
payor through an increase in the selling price of the goods pro
duced directly or indirectly by the capital item.
2

Under the incom e type, recovery of the VAT paid would be
allowed ratably over the life of the asset; thus VAT paid on the
purchase of a capital item with a five-year life would be recov
ered one-fifth in the year of purchase and one-fifth in each of the
following four years. The consumption type will be the only one
considered in detail here.
Why Is VAT Significant Today?

The primary reason for VAT’s initial consideration in the
United States was its success in operation and increasing use
throughout Europe. When it is considered that Europe is a major
competitor of the United States in the world market, the effect
of VAT on trade becomes significant. Its apparent incentive for
companies to export created interest in the tax because of U.S.
balance-of-payments problems. However, as will be seen, a VAT
itself does not increase exports; it is, after all, a tax and needs to
be compared with an alternative tax to determine its effect on
exports.
More important than VAT’s success in operation in Europe is
its revenue-producing potential—something highly attractive to a
government facing substantial deficits in current and future fiscal
years. This potential is highlighted by comparing the forecasted
yield from a VAT to the revenues produced by U.S. income
taxes. Income tax yields are as follows.
Table I

Individual
Corporate

Actual
1973

Est.
1974

Est.
1975

103
36

(billions o f dollars)
118
39

129
48

Most studies maintain that a 1 percent VAT levied on the gross
national product of the private sector (with exemptions for food
and medical care) would yield approximately $6 billion. Thus, a
6 percent VAT could yield as much as corporate income tax col
lections for 1973. (See Exhibit 1, p. 45, for income tax yields.)
The magnitude of the revenues that the United States might
realize were it to adopt a VAT structure comparable to the Euro
3

pean countries is illustrated by the following standard rates of
value-added tax presently employed.

Table 2

Country

Percent

Belgium
18
Denmark
15
France
20
Germany
11
Luxembourg
10
Netherlands
16
Norway
20
Sweden
17.65
United Kingdom
8
( See Exhibit 2, p. 46, for a complete list of rates. )
Even at the lowest rate of tax shown above (8 percent), VAT
would generate as much revenue as the present corporate income
tax.
In assessing VAT, comparisons to the tax burden and revenue
sources of other countries have frequently been made. In this
connection, Exhibit 3, p. 47, shows the percentage of taxes col
lected by various countries in relation to their gross national prod
ucts. Exhibit 4, p. 48, shows the percentage of total revenues col
lected from different types of taxes.
From these exhibits, it can be concluded that the United States
depends on income taxation, particularly corporate income taxa
tion, to a greater extent than most other developed countries.
Thus, our exports bear a greater share of the overall tax burden,
resulting in a competitive disadvantage—but one that is difficult
to measure.
In terms of Gross National Product (GNP), the United States
does not appear to tax as heavily as most other countries. There
fore, the statistics seem to indicate U.S. ability to support a rise
in taxation. However, if the United States increased its total tax
revenues by $30 billion (approximately 2 percent of GNP) through
additional income taxes, whether by closing loopholes or by in
creasing rates or by a combination of the two, the U.S. statistics
4

in Exhibit 3 would compare to those for several countries whose
economies are similar, as follows:
Table 3

Tax Revenues As a Percentage of GNP*

Country

Total

Germany
U.K.
Canada
U.S.

35.97
34.73
33.53
31.06

Consum p
tion
Taxes on In com e
Taxes
11.77
13.61
15.19
15.56

12.07
15.72
15.42
9.75

Social
Security
Contribution
12.13
5.40
2.92
5.75

If, instead, the $30 billion were raised through indirect taxes,
the same modification of Exhibit 3 would have shown the follow
ing:
Table 4

Tax Revenues As a Percentage of GNP

Country

T otal

Germany
U.K.
Canada
U.S.

35.97
34.73
33.53
31.06

Consum p
tion
Taxes on In com e
Taxes
11.77
13.61
15.19
12.56

12.07
15.72
15.42
12.75

Social
Security
Contribution
12.13
5.40
2.92
5.75

Because the other countries shown currently raise less revenues
in terms of GNP from income taxes and more from consumption
taxes, an attempt to raise additional revenues through income
taxes would carry the U.S. even further away from those more
comparable economies even though total tax revenue in the U.S.
as a percentage of GNP would still remain the lowest. What
effect this would have on our competitive position in world mar-

* Source of all comparative tax statistics in this report is Revenue Statistics
of OECD M ember Countries 1965-1972.
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kets is not known; nor is the eff ect it would have on taxpayer
morale and attitude towards compliance. These would be two
areas of concern.
In any event, it should be acknowledged that no standard of
proper mix of direct and indirect taxation could ever be estab
lished applicable to all countries for all periods of time. Probably
the safest observation is that U.S. taxpayers might better tolerate
an increase in indirect taxes of $30 billion rather than such an
increase in income taxes if they are compared to the citizens of
Canada, Germany, and the U.K. In those countries there is pres
ently no great spread between income taxes and consumption
taxes as a percentage of GNP, although the percentage of con
sumption taxes in each case exceeds the percentage of income
taxes. The United States, by increasing consumption taxes rather
than income taxes, would bring its percentages in line with the
other countries. An increase in income taxes would put the United
States further out of line with those other countries. The proba
bility that U.S. taxpayers might tolerate an increase in indirect
taxes seems to be supported, too, by a nationwide opinion poll,
conducted on behalf of the Advisory Commission on Intergovern
mental Relations. This showed that 46 percent of the general
public believe that if state governments must raise taxes substan
tially, they should increase indirect taxes on sales.

How VAT Works
Common System

In theory, VAT works in a simple fashion. (See Exhibit 5, p.
49.) Normally, the tax-collecting chain begins with the sale of
raw materials upon which VAT is charged by the seller at a fixed
rate and remitted by him to the government. The purchasing
manufacturer thereafter charges VAT again on his sale of the
finished or semifinished product to another manufacturer or a dis
tributor. However, instead of remitting the total collection to the
government, the manufacturer is entitled to reimburse himself
for the VAT paid upon his purchase of the raw material. Only
the difference, or the tax on the “value added” by the manufac
turer, is paid to the government. The process is repeated by the
second manufacturer or the distributor when he in turn makes a
6

sale in the business cycle; VAT is charged on the total sales price,
the seller reimburses himself from the proceeds, and only the
difference is remitted to the government. When a final sale is
made—usually by a retailer to the ultimate consumer—the tax may
or may not be shown separately, for at this point the chain comes
to an end.
While the retailer is entitled to a reimbursement for VAT previ
ously paid, the purchaser, who in his capacity as the consumer of
the item acquired is not in the business of selling goods or ser
vices, must bear the full tax cost. Thus, the VAT cost is passed
through each business operation until it is paid in the purchase
price by the retail consumer or client. It is intended to be a tax
that is passed on to the ultimate consumer, although the effect of
the VAT rate on the price the market will bear may in some cases
force a seller to reduce his profit margin.
It should be noted that the pass-through of the VAT cost ap
plies to all purchases made by a business. Thus, VAT paid on an
electrical bill, or on stationery supplies, or charged with legal and
accounting fees all may be recovered on collections of VAT made
on billings of the enterprise. The system, therefore, depends heav
ily on adequate invoicing, which sets out VAT as a separate item
up until the final sale for ostensibly private consumption.
Rates

The fewer the exceptions or modifications, the easier the system
operates. Nevertheless, all the systems presently operating in
Europe do grant “relief” to certain types of sales, generally in one
of three possible forms:
1. The sale is taxed at a reduced rate (multiple-rate system).
2. The sale is exempt.
3. The taxable base is reduced.
At this time Sweden is the only country applying the third
method.
M ultiple Rates. Permitting two or more rates of VAT within
a single production chain may or may not decrease total tax paid.
If there is a standard rate of 3 percent and a reduced rate of I
percent, total tax paid would not change as long as the standard
7

rate is applied at the end of the chain. For instance, if an item
were purchased for $100 in a transaction to which the reduced
rate (1 percent) applied, one dollar of VAT would be collected
and remitted. If the item were thereafter sold for $400 in a trans
action in which a standard rate (3 percent) applied, the normal
twelve dollars would be collected, the seller would reimburse him
self for the one dollar previously paid and remit eleven dollars
to the government. The effect in such a case is merely to shift
forward the total collection of tax. If, however, the situation were
reversed and the normal rate applied to the $100 purchasemeaning that a VAT of three dollars was paid upon acquisition—
and the reduced rate applied to the $400 sale—meaning that only
four dollars in VAT was collected upon the second transactionthen total VAT collected would drop from twelve to four dollars.
Thus, a reduced rate at the end of a chain will also reduce total
VAT collected. (See Exhibits 6 and 7, pp. 50 and 51.)
Exem ptions. Although the system might operate more easily
if exemptions were kept to a minimum, there would be a number
of operations in most countries which would be placed outside
the system. These would include very small, probably retail,
enterprises with a marginal annual turnover, financial transactions
(life insurance, banking, security purchases, and sales), medical
and educational services, charitable activities, newspaper, periodi
cal, and book sales, and sales of agricultural products and food.
While these enterprises are required to pay VAT on most of their
purchases, they are not required to charge the tax on their sales.
The primary result of the exemption, then, is that they cannot
recoup VAT paid through charges for the tax on their sales. VAT
paid becomes a cost of doing business just like any other cost.
Where the business sells mostly at retail, the inability to recover
VAT in the normal course may not be a disadvantage, because
VAT is also not charged on the “value added” by the exempt
person or entity. Where profit margins are sufficiently high, an
exemption can even prove to be a competitive advantage. Thus,
while a small exempt retailer may purchase an item for $100 and
pay a 3 percent VAT just as a larger taxable retailer, his price to a
retail customer need not include VAT, and thus can be less than
the amount charged by the larger retailer. For instance, if the
larger retailer’s resale price was $200, he would have to charge
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$206 (assuming a 3 percent V A T), recovering the three dollars
paid earlier and remitting the three dollars levied on his profit
to the government. The smaller exempt retailer could charge
something less and perhaps still make the same profit, depending
on operating costs. His price would have to cover VAT costs on
purchases, but not VAT on the resale.
In some cases, activities normally exempt may wish to have the
option to elect to be covered, especially if small profit margins
don’t give them any real advantage over their larger taxable com
petitors. Such elections are permitted for some activities in a
number of European systems. Other activities, like farming, may
be granted a reduced rate that does not affect prices as substan
tially as other rates but does permit the activity to recover VAT
paid on purchases, if not from VAT collected on sales, then from
the government by way of refunds. Such variants complicate the
system, of course, but seem to be widespread. Businesses that are
both exempt on certain lines of activity and taxable on others also
present special problems requiring purchases to be prorated be
tween exempt and taxable sales so that VAT recovery is limited
to those purchases that can be related to taxable sales.
When a person or entity is exempt and makes a sale to a tax
able person (that is, a sale that is not at retail), the taxable pur
chaser, not being charged (directly, at least) for VAT, cannot
reimburse himself for that cost upon resale. Thus, if the price
charged for an item by an exempt seller was $100, which in fact
covered two dollars of VAT paid earlier in the chain, and the tax
able purchaser in turn sold the item for $200 in a sale to which a
3 percent value-added tax applied, the latter would collect six
dollars and remit the entire amount to the government. As a re
sult, total VAT paid would come to eight rather than only six
dollars, the total tax paid in the normal case. An exempt stage in
the course of a business chain has the effect, therefore, of in
creasing total tax paid because the taxable purchaser from an
exempt seller is not entitled to reimburse himself for VAT that
may have been paid on the item before he acquired it. That is, if
an exempt seller is selling to the ultimate consumer, he could
have a competitive advantage over a nonexempt seller of the
same product; conversely, if he is selling to a nonexempt reseller
who is not the ultimate consumer, he would suffer competitive
disadvantage. ( See Exhibit 8, p. 52.)
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Zero Rate. In some cases, the government finds it desirable to
allow a refund or credit for prior VAT paid, even though a sub
sequent sale is exempt. One method of overcoming the adminis
trative problems involved in refunding or crediting taxes paid on
purchases when the subsequent sale is exempt is by use of a zero
rate. For example, if export sales are exempted, that is of no
great benefit to the exporter unless he can recover the taxes he
paid on purchases attributable to the export. Rather than having
two categories of exempt sales, (1 ) tax recoverable and (2 ) nonrecoverable, the zero rating, which is in essence an exempt, taxrecoverable sale, has been devised. This way, all truly exempt
sales will be in the nonrecoverable category.
Refunds and Credits

Where a business is just commencing, or where it has heavy
export or other exempt or zero rated sales, it is possible for its
collections of VAT on sales to be materially less than it paid on
purchases. In cases of this type, the government may refund the
difference on a monthly or quarterly basis, or it may require the
entity to carry forward the unreimbursed VAT against sales of
later periods. In such a case, if sales by the entity do not incur
sufficient VAT to offset VAT paid on purchases both currently
and on a carry-over basis, the unrecovered tax obviously becomes
a cost to the enterprise. Generally speaking, the refund system is
preferred over that requiring an enterprise to recover its VAT
on a credit basis over an extended period of time.
Capital Goods

One interesting feature of VAT as it is usually applied is that
purchases of capital goods are included within the system. Thus,
manufacturers’ purchases of machinery and equipment would
generally be subject to the normal rate, which would be recov
ered currently by VAT collected on sales of manufactured goods.
While permitting full current recovery of VAT on capital goods
is the usual system (consumption), some authorities argue that
VAT on such items ought not to be recovered at all ( gross prod
uct system) or VAT should be recovered only over the life of the
asset on an annual pro rata basis (income system). While the
last two systems have not been generally accepted, most coun
tries that have introduced VAT have provided transitional rules
10

with respect to VAT paid on capital goods. Thus, in the first year
of the new VAT system only a partial recovery of VAT paid on
capital goods is permitted, while in the second year, an addi
tional amount is allowed, and so forth until all VAT paid on such
items is reimbursed. This phase-in to a full-consumption VAT has
been effected because allowing full recovery of the tax immedi
ately could seriously affect the capital goods market where VAT
replaced a sales tax that was not recoverable. The impact on tax
revenues is another reason for going gradually to a full consump
tion system. Under a sales tax no part of the tax on capital goods
would be recovered, but under a VAT all of it would be recov
ered in the year of sale. Yet the VAT on the sales resulting from
use of the capital equipment would be spread over many years.

General Advantages and Disadvantages of VAT
In speaking out in favor of a federal value-added tax, Dan
Throop Smith, former Treasury official in charge of tax policy in
the Eisenhower Administration, called it “the least bad” tax.1 His
successor in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Stanley
Surrey, viewed it as an undesirable addition to the tax laws and
referred to it as “a second best tax.”2 These differing views, attest
ing to how controversial the VAT is, appear all through the dis
cussions in the last several years as VAT has come under consid
eration in the United States.
It is difficult to talk about VAT in the abstract because the prob
lems arising from its adoption depend largely on what taxes, if
any, are replaced. Obviously, the incidence and impact of the
tax would vary if it supplanted the employment taxes, for exam
ple, as compared with reducing the corporate income tax. The
recent suggestion that a VAT be used to supplant some residen
tial real estate taxes could well have another, entirely different
overall effect. In concept, however, the tax itself has certain ad
vantages and certain disadvantages that are stressed in the widen
ing debate over future tax policy in the United States.

1 Smith, “The Case For Value-Added Tax,” 48-6 Harvard Business Review
77 (1 9 7 0 ).
2 Stanley Surrey, “A Value-Added Tax for the United States—A Negative
View,” The Tax Executive, (April 1969) p. 151.

11

The proponents of a VAT frequently see its adoption as a means
of raising the billions needed by the federal government to finance
growing budget deficits and the growing demands of state and
local jurisdictions. They note its rapid spread in Europe and be
lieve it will create a better balance in our tax system citing the
following main advantages of a VA T:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Large potential for revenue
More stable revenues
Neutral in application
Encouragement of efficient resource allocation
Encouragement of saving
Ease of administration
Incentive for exports
Contribution to a proper tax mix

The opponents of a federal VAT believe our present tax system
works remarkably well and believe it to be capable of raising
the needed billions in revenue if loopholes were closed, inequi
ties removed, and the base broadened. They see no need to emu
late the Europeans in tax policy, and as Stanley Surrey has stated,
“After all, the American Revolution was fought in part to win the
right to determine our own tax system.” The major deficiencies
in the VAT emphasized by its opponents are as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Too large a revenue potential
Lack of counter-cyclical balance
Inequitable to new or marginal enterprises
Hidden from taxpayers
Inflationary effect on prices
Difficulties of administration
No incentive for exports
Brings regression into the tax mix

Analysis of Advantages

L a rg e Potential fo r Revenue. That a federal VAT has a tre
mendous potential for revenue is obvious. Consumption provides
a much greater base than any other federal tax system presently
employed. Its value base can be as large as the gross national
product. As noted above, even allowing for exemptions for vital
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necessities and certain industries and groups, it has been estimated
that each percentage point of VAT would bring in between 5
and 6 billion dollars. Thus a low tax rate of 6 percent would
bring in about as much as the corporate income tax. It also brings
in taxpayers not now subject to tax or subject to lower taxes
under other systems currently administered. Expenditures by
organizations exempt from income tax would be subject to VAT.
Individuals living off capital or tax-exempt income would pay a
VAT. Thus, expenditures made from receipts under the social
security system or from income from state obligations would
become taxable. Appreciation of net worth, which results in a
higher standard of living, would be taxed even though the gains
were not themselves realized.
M ore Stable Revenues. In addition to the large potential for
revenues, VAT, not being dependent on profits, would also avoid
the fluctuations of our present tax system and result in a more
stable and predictable basis of federal income.
N eutral in Application. It is recognized that neutrality means
different things to different people. From a VAT standpoint, neu
trality appears to mean that business decisions are not deter
mined or largely influenced by tax factors.
VAT, being based on the selling price of products, does not
favor capital-intensive over labor-intensive industries. The prod
ucts of efficient as well as inefficient companies would bear the
same tax as contrasted, for example, with an income tax, which
only profitable enterprises pay. This “price umbrella” effect
presently is said to subsidize the marginal producer at the ex
pense of the taxpayers at large. A share of government services
and resources used by a business would be paid for whether the
business had profits or not.
The use of equity financing or debt financing would not affect
the tax except as their elements were passed on in price. Present
income tax incentives would be nullified. The form of business
organization would not affect the tax. Proprietorships, partner
ships, and other ventures would all bear the same tax burden on
their products or services, creating neutrality in business for
mation.

13

Encourages Efficient R esource Allocation.
The neutrality
really results from the fact that there is no tax as such on the
business itself but only on the end product or service. Thus, all
advantages lie in reducing the total costs of the business reflected
in the ultimate selling price. While there is a similar advantage
under an income tax system, expenditure can also be influenced
by deductibility for income tax purposes. It has been alleged that,
freed of an inducement to wasteful spending under an income
tax system, business would be encouraged to a more efficient allo
cation of resources. Thus, the imposition of a VAT could well
lead to modernization of plant with consequently lower unit costs.
Other measures such as investment credit incentives and fast
write-offs, which are sometimes discriminatory and uneconomic
and always politically vulnerable, would not be necessary under
a VAT.
Encourages Saving. A tax on consumption, since it is only in
curred when money is spent, puts a premium on savings—as con
trasted with the bias against savings inherent in an income tax
where part of the income itself must be paid over to the govern
ment and cannot be saved. Those who believe that capital forma
tion will be severely strained to meet the demands of the future
see this as a prime advantage of VAT.
E ase o f Administration. A VAT is relatively easy to admin
ister. The self-policing aspects of the tax have proved to be
sound in application. The tax schemes recently brought to light
in France, for example, where fraudulent invoices were used,
could just as easily have taken place in an income tax system. In
any event, good common sense auditing would readily catch
cheating in a VAT system.
Such auditing as performed by the tax authorities could con
centrate more heavily on the retail sector. At lower stages of dis
tribution, deficiencies at one level would merely be recouped by
the government at the next level. Losses at the retail level would
be permanent losses, however, and auditing—at least based on a
review of taxes collected on a markup over taxes paid—would be
necessary.
The reporting and record-keeping requirements naturally de
14

pend on the number of rates employed, exemptions granted, and
rebates allowed. In the ideal VAT system with a single rate and
few exemptions, the accounting procedures would be relatively
simple. I
Incentive for Exports. The prime reason for the institution
of the VAT in Europe was the desire to harmonize taxes on ex
ports within the Common Market. The use of exemptions or a
zero rate on exports removes the tax inhibitions and inequities on
trade and ensures a uniform tax burden in each jurisdiction. This
same rationale extends beyond the EEC and encompasses all
countries signatory to the General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs (G A T T ). Under GATT, all indirect taxes on export trans
actions may be rebated and are not treated as export subsidies,
which are prohibited.
Export products of a country that relies heavily on indirect
taxes carry less of the overall tax burden and may have a com
petitive trade advantage. T h e imposition of a VAT, however,
does not create this advantage, but to the extent the tax substi
tutes for another tax, such as an income tax not rebatable under
GATT, an incentive to exports is achieved. ( See Exhibit 9, p. 53.)
Initially, the VAT in Europe largely substituted for other in
direct turnover taxes that were rebated on exports. Recently,
however, the rates of VAT have been increased in some countries
and other taxes on employment or income reduced. Whether
these changes, coupled particularly with currency revaluations,
will result in competitive pressures is very difficult to determine.
C ontributes to a Proper Tax Mix. Because of the question of
taxpayer morality that arises when an income tax is levied at too
high a rate, and because of a corporate income tax’s possible
effect on exports, it has been said that a mix of several different
taxes is more likely to meet the tests of a good tax structure than
is undue reliance on income as the measure of tax liability. In
seeking an equitable balance in the overall system, many econo
mists and tax advisers believe that taxes on wealth and spending
should become a more important source of federal revenues. Cer
tainly other countries have taken this course, and there is evi
dence that where more revenue is needed an indirect tax might
be preferred to increases in direct taxes.
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Analysis of Disadvantages of VAT

T oo L arg e a R evenue Potential. As has already been pointed
out, an important question is how the federal government should
raise substantial amounts of additional revenue needed in the
future. It has been estimated that in order to equal a VAT of
3 percent, the corporate rate would have to be raised to 65 per
cent. If both corporate and individual rates were adjusted, it
would require a surcharge of about 12.5 percent. Under the cir
cumstances, it can be realized why some government officials are
favorably inclined toward a continuing study of a VAT. Perhaps
the most illuminating statement against the VAT was made by
a long-time advocate of it, Dan Throop Smith; “If a VAT leads
to excessive government spending which would not otherwise
occur, the great revenue potential of VAT may be the best argu
ment against i t .’’
L a ck s Counter-C yclical Balances. The income tax is said to
have the advantage of being a built-in stabilizer for counter
cyclical fiscal policy. In boom periods it drains off more revenue
from the private sector, dampening an overheated economy. On
the downswing, of course, it has the reverse effect. The relative
inelasticity of a VAT lacks this counter-cyclical aspect and, while
not restraining a boom, it might even contribute to the decline
in consumption in a recession.
In equ itab le to N ew or M arginal Enterprises. As was previ
ously mentioned, the “price umbrella” effect of the corporate in
come tax is said to benefit enterprises striving for maturity and
profitability. If recognized as a desirable element in our federal
structure, this is an acceptable cost to be borne by more efficient,
mature industries. A VAT would remove the price umbrella and
all products would carry the tax. To many, this would have the
equitable result of requiring each business, regardless of its profit
ability, to include a proportionate share of the federal tax burden
in its billings for goods or services. Nevertheless, the new or mar
ginal business might not be able to meet the price competition
occasioned by a reduction of income taxes on profitable business
and a replacement of tax through a VAT on all business.
H idden From Taxpayers. As employed in Europe, the VAT is
a hidden tax insofar as the consumer is concerned. However,
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there is nothing inherent in a VAT system requiring it to be un
disclosed even at the consumer level. The tax can be separately
indicated at all stages if desirable.
On the other hand, most taxes on business that are passed on
ultimately to the consumer are hidden. To the extent it is shifted
forward (which is another subject all by itself), the corporate
income tax is hidden, as are federal and state taxes on payroll,
ad valorem taxes on real estate, inventories, and other personal
property, intangibles taxes, excise taxes, and the like. Many of
these taxes are normally treated as direct costs of sales, and in
some instances they are the largest single element of selling price
—although hidden. There have been few serious demands that
these taxes be shown separately, although some industries, such
as petroleum, do break down the selling price of certain products
at the retail level to reflect major direct taxes included therein.
Inflationary E ffects on Prices. A VAT, in concept, is inflation
ary. It is an additional element of cost to be passed on directly
to the consumer and thus increases the ultimate selling price.
This cost-push principle makes the imposition of a VAT a some
what dangerous undertaking. According to some economists, the
chain reaction creates the possibility of an inflationary spiral.
Experience abroad has been mixed on the ultimate price effects
of a VAT. Apart from the countries that merely substituted the
VAT for other turnover taxes, it appears that in some instances
the inflation being experienced was a result of the demand for
goods exceeding supply rather than an increase in costs. It is pos
sible that the institution of the VAT with its resulting higher
price had a dampening effect on demand leading to increased
prices not quite so high as the amount of the VAT.
Where the tax is a replacement for other taxes, the inflationary
aspects might be minimal. This would also be true where govern
ment expenditure policy reduces the need for personal outlays
leaving a larger balance for normal consumption and/or savings,
the latter of which is thought to be encouraged by a VAT’s great
revenue-producing potential. Of course, the lower the tax rate, the
lower the danger of inflationary aspects of a VAT. On the other
hand, if the tax is substantial, both savings and consumption
would drop unless taxpayers, through increased production, are
able to increase their total income to compensate for the tax.
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Furthermore, increases in any federal tax sufficient to produce
the same amount of revenue could also be argued to be inflation
ary. To the extent that corporate tax is shifted forward, prices
would rise; shareholders would not long sustain the burden of
the tax without applying pressure for price increases. Personal
income tax increases could lead to demands for wage adjustments.
This might also be true for employment tax increases. Changes in
excise taxes are usually passed forward directly. Accordingly,
while a VAT has inherently inflationary tendencies, it may differ
from other taxes in this regard only in that inflationary effects
would be felt sooner rather than later.
Difficulties o f Administration
T oo many new taxpayers The VAT, if applied throughout
the economy, would naturally require the filing of millions of tax
returns. This would also necessitate the keeping of countless rec
ords and invoices, the employment of additional personnel, and
the diversion of profitable hours to government business. While
the filing of additional returns is not welcome, the job might
largely be one of compilation of data currently being accumulated
and even reported to the state governments, forty-six of which
have a sales tax. Furthermore, any other tax of equal magnitude
could well require as much or more attention and ultimate ad
ministrative cost as the imposition of a VAT. In addition, a favor
able cash flow is usually experienced by business under a VAT,
in part offsetting compliance costs.
In terferes w ith state and local taxing jurisdictions
State
and local jurisdictions imposing a sales tax have a natural opposi
tion to a tax on consumption by the federal government. Sales
taxes in some states run as high as 7 percent and even a low-rate
VAT could well have an inhibiting effect on sales and tax collec
tions. However, some proponents of VAT, such as Professor Rich
ard Lindholm of the University of Oregon, believe that a federal
VAT is compatible with the state sales tax system and that in the
long run they could be integrated with mutual advantages. The
deductibility of state sales taxes for federal income tax purposes
would, of course, be affected by this proposal.
In the meantime, the proposal to adopt a federal VAT for the
purpose of state residential property tax relief would immediately
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project the federal government into the consumption area. It
should be noted that in the past the federal luxury taxes and ex
cise taxes have apparently worked side by side with state sales
taxes without undue hardship or impediment to state taxing
eff orts. Finally, proposals for revenue sharing and piggy-back col
lections are signs of present congressional encouragement of a
greater use of the income tax by states and localities. To the ex
tent states take advantage of this latter source of revenue, con
sumption taxation may open up to the federal government.
No Incentive for Exports. The export subsidy advantage for
VAT has been challenged repeatedly. Since VAT is not directly a
cost item to a producer, he obtains no direct benefits from its
remission. It is true, however, that a national VAT is not included
in a foreign sales price, thus permitting an exporter to charge
what might be considered a more competitive price abroad. To
this extent, exempting export sales from VAT can improve an ex
porter’s ability to compete in a foreign market. On the other hand,
if the country of destination imposes a VAT, any advantage at
tributable to tax relief is obviously counteracted. Furthermore,
even though a country imposes a VAT, it cannot be categorically
maintained that the local remission of VAT amounts to a subsidy.
Insofar as other tax costs, including the income tax, are compara
ble to similar taxes imposed in competing countries, such as the
United States, which has no VAT system, the effect of the rebate
can be shown to be negligible. Imposing a VAT and then remit
ting it on exports cannot act as a subsidy. However, VAT imposed
in lieu of an income tax, or an income tax increase that would not
be rebated, does shift overall tax costs from exported items and,
in this context, can be said to favor exports although it is not an
outright incentive for them.
Brings R egression into the U.S. Tax Mix. The opponents of a
VAT generally feel that if the favorable arguments are to be be
lieved, it is indeed a tax touchstone. As Professor Richard Mus
grave has stated, it represents: “A business tax that business
doesn’t pay, a consumer tax the consumer doesn’t see, and gov
ernment services enjoyed by all without knowing who paid for
them.” As already noted, there is consensus that a low rate of
VAT would yield a high total of tax revenue. However, a prime
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concern is that this burden would be shouldered, largely, by the
lower-income groups, who would be forced to spend a higher
proportion of income. Thus, the tax is said to be regressive.
To counter the regression argument, proponents point out that,
after giving consideration to the flow of government expenditures
generated by a VAT, the real incomes of the low-income groups
might be enhanced. When government expenditures, directly or
indirectly, distribute proportionately greater benefits to the lowincome groups than their aggregate contribution, the tax system
employed should be considered progressive. Thus, family allow
ances, student grants, pensions, medical payments, and similar
social benefits, liberalized through VAT financing, could free in
dividuals from having to save for those important contingencies.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that regressiveness can be
overcome by credits or refunds, although no other country has
employed such a system. On the other hand, exemptions for food,
clothing, medicine, and other necessities are common under the
European VAT systems, but they extend benefits beyond those
needing relief and, like credits or refunds, add complexity.
The problem of regression is one that must be faced in consid
ering the introduction of VAT into the U.S. tax system. The
charge of regression cannot be entirely answered by pointing out
that the present system, which relies on the income tax, is at
least adequately progressive so that presumably it could stand
a VAT, or that other countries, such as the United Kingdom, have
introduced VAT where they had none before. Opponents of VAT
counter that merely adequate progressiveness is insufficient and
that the United Kingdom had to inaugurate a VAT to enter the
Common Market whether it wanted to or not. Furthermore, what
other countries do should not mean that we must do the same.
At the heart of the highly political charge of regression, how
ever, is this fundamental question: Assuming (and the assump
tions are important) that significant revenues are needed and that
the income tax system cannot raise them without near confisca
tory rates, what other tax is available other than a tax on con
sumption? Further, there is evidence previously mentioned that
individual taxpayers would rather have a tax of this sort, paid
out piecemeal, than an income tax the payment of which looms so
much larger.
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2
Practical Aspects of VAT
Background
It could be said that value-added tax is a creation of the Euro
pean Economic Community. Outside the EEC , the only countries
that imposed a VAT until recently were Norway and Sweden.
Now Austria has it, and forms of a VAT are imposed in African
and South American countries. It has been rejected in Canada
and Japan as it was in the United Kingdom until that country
accepted it in order to become a member of the EEC . To see how
it has worked, then, we must look primarily to Europe and
especially the EEC .
On April 11, 1967, the Council of the European Economic Com
munity issued its first directive on the harmonization of its mem
ber states’ turnover tax laws. It provided for the replacement of
the present turnover tax systems by a value-added tax of the
consumption type. At that time, only France had a value-added
tax system; now, eight years later, all the nine member-countries
have such a system, in conformity with the 1967 directive.
One of the interesting aspects of the initial directive was the
provision that the tax should be levied up to and including the
retail stage, except that the tax could stop at the wholesale stage
until import duties were removed by the member states. If it
stopped at the wholesale stage, it was suggested that a separate
tax at the retail stage be levied to supplement the VAT. A few
years earlier, the Fiscal and Financial Committee had been orga
nized by the EEC to study the differences in the tax systems of
the member states and to make recommendations on how to
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overcome them. This committee recommended that a value-added
tax up to but not including the retail stage should be adopted
and suggested it be supplemented by a retail sales tax. In sub
stance, then, the EEC Council followed the recommendation of
the Fiscal and Financial Committee. It should be observed that
the committee was not looking for the ideal tax system, but rather
was concerned with the differences in the member states’ indirect
tax systems and how best to harmonize them. This is a significant
point and should be kept in mind when considering a VAT for
use in the United States. The VAT was not necessarily found to
be an ideal tax; rather, it was determined to be the best means
for achieving the goal of harmonization. The committee pointed
out that it would not be feasible to impose a retail sales tax as the
only form of turnover tax, particularly because of the substantial
number of small retail merchants who are unable to keep books.
This may have been a euphemistic way of saying that tax collec
tion would be difficult to enforce at the retail level; but, in any
event, the retail sales tax was ruled out for practical reasons
existing within the EEC.
On the date of the first directive, a second was also issued. This
one concerned the structure of the VAT; it defined terms and laid
down certain practical rules as to the tax base, exemptions, and
deductions. While this directive left member states wide latitude
in many areas, especially as to zero rating, the directive was spe
cific enough in many other areas so that it left little alternative
for the member states to take into account national peculiarities
without getting permission to do so from the commission.
There is now in the proposal stage another directive that is in
tended to resolve some of the questions left unanswered by the
first two directives, especially in the area of services rendered.
For example, in the earlier directives no mention was made of
financial (including banking) and insurance services. This new
directive ( in all probability the sixth1), if passed by the Council,
will exempt financial and insurance transactions. It defines more
precisely the method of taxing public transportation facilities.
The agricultural areas, too, will be the subject of more specific
instructions.
1 The third, fourth, and fifth directives, which are not reported here, dealt
primarily with deadlines for member states switching to a VAT.
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Various Methods of Determining the VAT Base
Before getting into some of the specifics of how VAT operates
in Europe, a brief comment about the various methods of deter
mining the VAT base is worthwhile. There are three generally
recognized methods of determining the tax base to which a valueadded tax rate may be applied. These are known as (1 ) the in
voice method, (2 ) the subtraction method, and (3 ) the addition
method.
Only the invoice method has been employed by the members
of the E E C and other countries that have adopted VAT. Usually
the other two methods, sometimes known as account methods,
are dismissed as cumbersome and not nearly as readily subject
to supervision and government control as is the invoice method.
Nonetheless, it is worth quickly reviewing the other two concepts
because they illustrate the principles of the tax in a different
manner and thus throw additional light on how VAT works. In
fact, the Michigan business activities tax (BA T ) employed a
variant of the subtraction method, and the proponents of VAT as
a direct tax, in complete or partial substitution of the U.S. cor
porate income tax, would presumably favor one or the other of the
two methods to determine the tax base.
So that the three methods of determining a VAT liability may
be compared with the more familiar income tax base calculation,
a highly simplified profit and loss statement for income tax pur
poses appears as Exhibit 10, p. 54. It should be noted that, for this
purpose, beginning and ending inventory is limited to purchased
material and that no attempt is made to assign overhead costs to
inventory. This is because VAT theoretically depends on the kinds
of expenditures made rather than on how they may be treated for
normal accounting purposes. The various accounts reflected are
identified according to whether they are utilized in determining a
VAT liability under the invoice method, the subtraction method,
or the addition method.
The second illustration merely summarizes the usual compari
son that might be made to determine a net VAT liability for a
period. (Exhibit 11, p. 55.) VAT collections on net sales are com
pared with VAT payments on all purchases, including capital
expenditures, which, of course, do not appear in the income tax
base calculation. The net difference is the amount of tax col
lected due the government.
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The third illustration, the subtraction method, utilizes the same
accounts as the invoice method but the presentation is varied.
(See Exhibit 12, p. 56.) Basically, the subtraction method is no
more than a comparison of the accounts used to summarize the
invoice method, but instead of substracting tax paid on purchases
from the tax collected on sales, all purchases are itemized and
subtracted from net sales to produce a tax base against which the
rate is applied to produce the tax liability. As previously noted,
the invoice method depends on VAT being recorded on each in
voice; the so-called subtraction method would presumably re
quire the same information on each invoice, hence the usual argu
ment that comparing accounts rather than VAT collections and
payments is nothing more than a more cumbersome way of doing
what the invoice method accomplishes more easily. The illustra
tion does, however, point out the fact that using this method per
mits determination of the tax due without necessarily comparing
actual collections and payments of the tax. Purchases, including
capital purchases, are subtracted from net sales, and the tax is
levied against the result. Where tax was collected or paid on each
taxable transaction, the amount due (or refundable) using the
subtraction method should exactly equal the balance due (or re
fundable) in the VAT accounts, but if VAT were not levied as a
transaction or indirect tax, the same amount could be collected
by using a determination similar to the subtraction method.
Handled in this manner, VAT could become a direct tax levied
upon each business rather than an indirect tax on the consumer
as it is generally supposed to be. VAT would then more closely
resemble the Michigan BAT and, in some respects, the present
corporate income tax.
The final illustration, the addition method, simply considers all
the accounts that are usually thought to reflect value added and
adjusts these for non-taxable receipts otherwise included in pro
fit, capital purchases, and changes in inventory in order to produce
the VAT base. ( Exhibit 13, p. 57.) Such a computation could be
made independently of actual collections and payments of the
tax, and this would also lend itself to the imposition of VAT as a
direct tax.
The illustrations are included primarily for completeness. While
it is important to demonstrate the various methods of collection,
and to point out that VAT could be levied as a direct tax, it is
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not recommended that VAT be handled in this manner. For an
indirect transaction tax, the invoice method does appear to be
the most appropriate means of determining liability, and this
method has been universally adopted.

European Treatment of VAT
and Possible U.S. Treatment
When Is the Tax Due?

Under the E E C ’s invoice method of determining VAT, in usual
cases and as a practical matter, the rendering of the invoice
determines when the VAT is due. This should not be confused
with when the tax must actually be paid to the government.
Strictly speaking, according to the E E C ’s second directive, VAT
is due when the delivery of goods is made or the performance of
services is completed. However, if payments for goods are made
or if an invoice is issued before delivery is made or services are
completed, a taxable event can arise when the payment is re
ceived, or when the invoice is rendered, but only in the amount
of the cash received or the invoice rendered. Delivery is consid
ered made when shipment to the purchaser begins. The place
where services are performed, where a right is conveyed, or
where property is used or processed determines the place of
service.
In the ordinary course, the invoice is rendered at the time of
delivery or shortly thereafter, so, as indicated, the time of in
voicing usually determines when the tax is due. In fact, many
countries require an invoice to be issued within a certain time
after delivery and, while there may be room for skulduggery by
juggling invoice dates, the supplier or seller usually wants his
money just as quickly as the government wants its tax. Thus, the
government usually has little to worry about in collection of the
VAT. It may be that companies would hold up invoicing ship
ments made in the last week of a taxable period, but if collection
of the selling price is delayed a week by this maneuver, the loss
of the total proceeds for a week may offset any gain in holding
the VAT proceeds for a longer period.
Although there is the problem of long-term contracts by which
delivery will not be completed for, say, more than a year, be
cause VAT remittances are based on invoices, most of the EEC
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countries conform to the directive. One important aspect from
the supplier’s point of view is that an interim invoice should
never be in an amount higher than he is going to collect.
As to when the collected VAT must be turned over to the
government, the second directive provides that a tax return must
be filed monthly and the tax due must be paid with the return.
It also provides for a relaxation of this provision in the case of
certain taxpayers, mostly small traders. Most of the E E C member
states conform to this directive although the return due dates
vary from ten days after the close of the preceding month in
Germany to thirty days after such closing date in Italy.
Refunds

In the EEC countries, relatively minor refunds are generally
made in the form of credits against the tax due for the following
month. However, where the refund is substantial and likely to
exceed the following month’s tax due, the refund procedure varies
considerably from country to country. (There is no paragraph
in the directives dealing with a refund procedure except in the
case of the tax paid on purchase of capital goods.) In Germany,
for example, the practice is to refund within three weeks after
the return is filed; whereas, in France, refunds are made quar
terly or even annually, depending on the amount.
From the standpoint of fairness, the taxpayer should have an
option whether to receive a refund or to carry forward a credit.
For example, a supplier such as a toy manufacturer that sells
40 percent of his annual volume in one month should not be bur
dened with carrying VAT on his purchases in inventory until he
disposes of the inventory several months later. Refunds should be
made within fifteen days after the monthly report is filed. If they
are not made promptly, it could lead to a manipulation of dates
of invoices by taxpayers on their own part and on the part of
their suppliers. If a government insists on having its tax no later
than, say, fifteen days after the month in which it became due, it
should be prepared to refund an overpayment within a commen
surate period of time.
Small Traders

In the EEC , the small trader—one whose annual gross receipts
do not exceed a specified amount—is exempt from the usual VAT
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provisions; that is, he is not required to collect the usual VAT,
but he is required to pay a VAT on purchases unless he purchases
from another small trader. In Italy and the United Kingdom,
there is an outright exemption for traders whose receipts do not
exceed the equivalent of $20,000 and in Germany and Belgium a
special tax is imposed at a lower rate for small traders. Thus, in
the EEC there is no uniformity of treatment of small traders,
other than to grant them special treatment.
To a great extent, the treatment of small traders by a country
would depend on the literacy of its people, their “tax morality,”
and the political consequences of imposing a VAT collection
system on every trader. A further consideration is the cost of com
plying with the law. If a VAT were imposed in the United States,
there would be no great need for special treatment of small
traders. Under U.S. local sales tax laws, small retailers are not
usually exempt from the collection and return procedures—the
corner candy store collects a tax on every sale—so a precedent
has been established for treating small traders in the same man
ner as other taxpayers. However, if a VAT return became too
diff i cult to prepare because of varied rates, a case might be made
for using a single rate for small traders, but, except at the retail
level, it is not likely that a small trader would be dealing in
different types of goods or services subject to different rates.
In the United States, there may have to be provisions for
special treatment for retailers (not necessarily small traders) of
low-priced goods who sell such goods one at a time and who do
not ordinarily issue invoices. ( Under the E E C ’s second directive,
invoices are required to be rendered on sales by taxpayers.) In
such cases a cash register receipt might qualify as an invoice. The
VAT due from such retailers would have to be determined by
reference to something other than invoices, in any event, because
most of their sales would be to “nontaxpayers,” that is, to ulti
mate consumers.
Exemptions and Zero Rating

The genesis of every exception to any tax, whether it is by ex
emption, deduction, or reduced rate is the attempt to meet some
social, economic, or political objective that is deemed desirable.
If, then, the ideal method of imposing a tax is to keep exceptions
to a minimum or eliminate them altogether, there is bound to be
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a conflict with social, economic, and political ideas.
For example, in the United States there are exceptions to the
income tax in the form of exemptions for religious, charitable,
and educational institutions, local governments, and for pension
and profit-sharing trusts. Moreover, if a taxpayer shares his in
come with any of the exempt organizations, he is entitled to a
deduction for this sharing. In the case of religious, charitable,
and educational institutions their favorable treatment is, the argu
ment runs, linked with their promotion of the common good and,
therefore, contributions to them should be encouraged, not dis
couraged, by tax factors. Examples of exceptions in the form of
reduced rates are the capital gains tax rates, which have the effect
of encouraging investments in worthwhile enterprises. All of the
exceptions are consistent with worthwhile objectives, but they do
present problems as shown by the volumes of tax cases, regula
tions, and rulings in these areas. The point is, however, that all
exceptions are related to social, economic, or political factors—
factors that vary in degree from country to country. This point
should be kept in mind in the following paragraphs where it is
shown that one VAT country, or maybe all, exempt a particular
activity from the VAT.
In the value-added tax system, the exceptions to the norm are
by exemption or by reduced rate, including zero rating. They can
be approached in two ways: first, from the aspect of the seller
and, second, from the aspect of the purchaser. In the first, the
seller would be exempted from collecting a tax no matter to whom
he sells; in the second, the seller would be exempted from col
lecting a tax on sales to specified purchasers only. (A reduced rate
could be applied in the same manner.) For example, if a charita
ble institution is engaged in selling books, all of its sales might be
exempt were it decided to exempt such institutions from the
tax. Or sales of books to the institution might be exempt because
the sales are made to a charitable organization. In the EEC , the
approach is the first method; that is, the selling activity is exempt
and the purchaser’s category is ignored. There are minor excep
tions to this approach in France, but the vast majority of ex
emptions are applied to activities, not to purchasers, although it
could be said the zero rating of exports is in effect an exemption
applicable to a purchaser.
The E E C Council had this to say about exceptions: “Since the
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introduction of zero rates creates difficulties, it is highly desirable
to keep exemptions within very narrow limits and, where tax
relief is deemed necessary, to provide for the application of re
duced rates which should be high enough to normally permit the
deduction of the tax paid at the preceding stage. . ."2 The Coun
cil recognized that the agricultural area would present problems,
so it left exemptions in that area up to the member states. In the
service area, member states were given a great deal of discretion;
however, they were directed not to exempt—
1.
2.
3.
4.

Licensing or sale of patents and other intangibles;
Architectural, engineering, and other services;
Services in the advertising area; and
Domestic shipment and storage of goods.

Treatment of VAT Within Specific Activities
With the foregoing exceptions in mind, the treatment of specific
activities in the VAT countries is examined.
Educational Institutions

In most cases within the EEC , tuition fees and room fees are
exempt; however, books sales by these institutions are taxable in
some countries and exempt in others. In the United States, private
educational institutions might be better off subject to the tax. For
many institutions, tuition fees make up less than half their gross
receipts; if they are engaged in a large capital improvement
program, the VAT paid on expenditures for improvement would
be recovered only if they were subject to tax. An exemption from
VAT could result in still higher tuition fees since the VAT paid
would not be recovered, but a zero rating, which would result
in the recovery of VAT paid, should not result in any increase in
tuition fees. Since educational institutions have always received
favorable treatment in U.S. tax laws, both federal and local, there
is no reason to believe that such treatment would be discontinued
with a VAT. The zero rating of such institutions, however, has

2 1 CCH Common Market Reporter, Paragraph 3135 (Unofficial CCH Trans
lation of Second Council Directive originally issued in French and German).
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nothing to do with equity; it merely advances the social objective
of benefitting them and their students.
Health Services

Doctors’ and nurses’ services are uniformly exempt throughout
the EEC . Only in France are private hospital services subject to
tax. Sale of prescription drugs is subject to tax in some countries,
exempt in others, and zero rated in the United Kingdom. The
sale of nonprescription drugs is uniformly subject to tax. In the
United States there is no reason why sales of drugs and medicine
should be subject to tax.
Hospital Care

It must be remembered that in the European communities
health care is far more a function of the government than it is in
the United States. Hospital care is taxable in all countries except
the United Kingdom, where it is zero rated. It is estimated that
the United States has relatively far more patients treated in pri
vate hospitals than the United Kingdom has, for example, so that
when hospital care services are taxed in the United Kingdom, the
tax is more likely to apply to private hospitals for the wealthy
rather than private hospitals of the sort that are a part of the
general U.S. system. Thus, the taxing of hospitals in the EEC
should not necessarily be looked to as a precedent for taxing or
exempting here.
Charitable Institutions

Educational institutions are somewhat akin to charitable insti
tutions, and they probably should be treated in the same manner,
although charitable institutions are not likely to have the “plant”
that educational institutions do. In the United States, both
charitable and educational institutions are treated favorably for
income and sales tax purposes, so it is not likely that they would
be treated any less favorably for VAT purposes. Exempting their
services from the collection of tax would be no great problem;
however, there could be a problem if their purchases were ex
empt from tax. This would mean that all goods purchased would
have to be analyzed to determine the amount of VAT previously
attributed to them. A way around this would be for the seller to
collect a VAT from the institution and then have the institution
claim a refund from the government for the tax it paid, in other
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words, make it a zero rated taxpayer for its charitable and edu
cational services. Where such institutions, however, have trans
actions that compete with private business, it would seem that
they should be subject to the same rates to which private business
is subject.
Real Estate

Transfers of real estate, whether it is improved or unimproved,
are not contemplated as being part of a VAT system by the EEC.
In the first directive, the EEC clearly states that the system is
based on the imposition of a general consumption tax. Unim
proved real estate is neither “consumed” nor produced; thus
there is no “value added” to unimproved real estate. Moreover,
in most EEC countries a separate tax other than VAT is imposed
on the total value of real property transfers. To tax a transfer
under two systems seems neither practical nor politic. If more
revenue from such transactions is desired, an increase in rates of
the separate tax would be easier than making the transactions
subject to a transfer tax. Italy is a notable exception to the gen
eral rule, since it does impose VAT on sales of improved real
estate (the improvements only) when sold through a dealer.
The same directive holds that construction of real property is
subject to the VAT; that is, the builder would charge the pur
chaser a tax on his invoices for construction of the building. How
ever, the purchaser adds no value to the building, unless of course
he has improvements to the property made by a contractor,
in which case he will pay the contractor a VAT on the amount
of the latter’s invoice. (In the majority of cases it is a question
of whether the labor involved in home improvements made by the
do-it-yourselfer adds any value to his property.) Thus, ordinarily
no value is considered added by the owner who has not been sub
jected to tax. This is not to say that a tax could not be imposed
on the transfer of real property, but, strictly speaking, it would
not be a VAT. As a matter of fact, the proposed sixth directive,
if passed as it now reads, would tax transfers of buildings and
land on which a building is to be erected by a taxable person,
generally one engaged in business. However, after the first sale
only the difference between the purchase price and the selling
price would be taxable.
On the other hand, rentals of commercial property are treated
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differently by most countries. Here the theory is that the lessor
is in a business and has paid a VAT on the improvements of his
business property. He then rents the property to a lessee who is
the ultimate consumer of the property, the owner merely being
a middleman between the contractor and the lessee—a middleman
who has added value to the property in the form of services and
profit. Thus, unlike the case of sales of real property, rentals of
such property for commercial use are subject to VAT. In some
cases, there is no essential difference between rentals of property
and sales of property; however, to treat the two transactions in
the same manner ( either both exempt or both taxable) could re
sult in greater problems than it would solve.
In the United States, where there are no significant state or
local real estate transfer taxes and none at the federal level, a
VAT on real estate transfers could be imposed, although it would
not be in keeping with the principle of the tax. The political and
social questions of taxing such transfers at any significant rate
would be the principal obstacles in the way of such a tax.
Rents on Residential Property

In most VAT countries, rentals of residential property are
either exempted or zero rated. For years, many European coun
tries have had shortages of residential property, so severe a short
age that laws have been passed in France and the United King
dom, for example, holding that residential property cannot be
converted into commercial property unless “replacement” resi
dential property is constructed elsewhere. Thus, it has not been
considered desirable to tax rents of residential property that
would increase the rental to the lessee at a time when rental
property is already at a premium.
In some of the larger U.S. cities, the same holds true. More
over, by not taxing such rents, one regressive aspect of a VAT is
eliminated. The two greatest expenditures of low-income groups
are food and housing, accounting for perhaps anywhere from
50 to 90 percent of lower-income groups’ costs.
Food and Food Products

In keeping with all consumption taxes imposed on a propor
tional basis, the VAT is considered to be regressive. Again to re
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duce regressive tendencies of VAT, sales of food and food prod
ucts are, by and large, subjected to a lower rate of tax in the EEC .
Only the United Kingdom, among the major countries, zero rates
food sales. No country exempts them because the selling com
panies would not be able to recover the VAT they paid on their
substantial amounts of purchases. As has been pointed out, the
sting of regression of the tax can be eliminated or reduced by a
proper application of the revenues or an equivalent income tax
reduction or refund procedure. Thus, the objectives of keeping
regression out while keeping simplicity in can be achieved.
In every country, restaurant sales are subject to the VAT, and
because such sales are now subject to sales taxes in the United
States, it is not likely that there would be any exemption for them
under a VAT.
Used Equipment

Sales of used equipment by businesses are taxed by all coun
tries. On the other hand, sales of used items by private individuals
are not. While the imposition of VAT on used equipment seems
to violate the principle that an article should not be taxed twice
because it cannot be consumed twice, the problem is most ap
parent in competition between used equipment dealers and new
equipment dealers. For example, if new equipment is subject to a
20 percent VAT and used equipment is not, the question of
whether to buy a new car or a used car may well be decided on
the basis of the 20 percent tax differential alone. This would have
a particularly serious effect where there is a newly imposed highrate VAT. When the used car market consists of cars that have
been subjected to the VAT, the price spread between a used car
and a new car should not be as great as it was when the used
car market consisted of cars not originally subjected to the VAT.
However, here the principle of supply and demand would come
into play. If a VAT were imposed, thus reducing the spread be
tween the new and used cars, would prices for used cars go up—
and how much? These questions can only be posed speculatively
until a VAT is actually levied.
Another problem is the potential for driving used car dealers
out of business. If the used car dealer is subject to the VAT but
the nondealer is not, the exempt purchaser of a used car would
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naturally tend to buy from the nondealer rather than from the
dealer.
Lease of Tangible Property

In every EEC country the lessor of personal property is sub
ject to the VAT, One problem in this category arises when the
rental is essentially a financing transaction. That is, the customer
rents the machine from the lessor for ten years, say, at $1,000
per year with an option to buy at a minimum cost expected to be
considerably below the market value of the machine. In essence,
the lessee has purchased the machine. An outright purchase at
the beginning of the ten-year period would have cost the lessee,
say, $5,000. Thus the difference is due to interest payable to the
“lessor” for financing the transaction. Only in the United King
dom would such a transaction be treated as a financing transac
tion and the interest portion be exempt from VAT. Does the im
position of VAT in those cases result in any hardship to the pur
chaser? If the purchaser is an exempt person, there could be an
added cost that would encourage him to borrow money from a
bank to purchase the asset outright. This problem could exist
even when the leasing transaction is not tantamount to a financ
ing transaction but becomes especially acute when form rather
than substance governs the imposition of the tax. The proposed
sixth directive, however, would treat rentals with options to pur
chase as sales transactions.
Financial Transactions

None of the EEC countries extends its VAT provisions to loans
and deposits; that is, the interest paid is not subject to the VAT,
It is noteworthy that in many countries financial institutions are
subject to a separate tax. Further, this nontaxability is somewhat
in keeping with the principle of a consumption VAT because
there is nothing, neither goods nor services, consumed to any ex
tent. Certainly, no services are performed by a depositor when
he deposits money in a financial institution. There is to a degree a
consumption of services when a financial institution makes a loan
to a customer; however, the interest income attributable to such
services makes up a relatively small part of the total interest
receipts, and it is questionable whether a VAT should be imposed
on the entire amount of any interest received by a financial
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institution. A lower rate of VAT would solve the problem but
could create others, especially among banks of different cate
gories, such as savings banks that make mortgage loans to exempt
persons as compared to commercial banks that make loans to tax
able businesses that will recover any VAT paid on interest. Thus,
in these situations, social and political problems would be of para
mount concern.
To the extent banks are involved in other than strictly financial
transactions, such as leasing or consulting for a fee, they should be
treated just as other taxpayers engaged in those fields are treated,
as is usual in the EEC . Lessors of property would have to revise
their methods of operations if they could not compete success
fully with financial institutions because of a VAT.
Government Services

The treatment of government services can be a serious problem.
If the government competes with private business and is not
taxed, while private services are, private services could be driven
out of business. There are two possible solutions: (1 ) subject
the government services to tax or (2 ) zero rate the private ser
vices. In the EEC countries, the first method is generally favored
as more practical because it is easier to tax all government ser
vices than to determine which private services compete with
government services and therefore should be zero rated.
Transportation

Transportation services are generally subject to VAT un
less the goods are destined for export. If cross-border land
transportation involves passengers, most countries would charge
VAT for that portion of the fare attributable to travel within the
country. The one general exception to this is international air
transportation of passengers, which is zero rated by all countries.
Because in most cases such transportation is government owned
or subsidized and there is no private competition, the taxing
of the services would be somewhat academic.
Other than the transportation of goods across international
boundaries, there would not appear to be any reason for special
treatment for transportation in the United States. International
transport of passengers might also be zero rated because every
VAT country now zero rates such services. To do otherwise might
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result in undue burdens for U.S. carriers in competition with
foreign carriers—certainly, roundtrip tickets on U.S. carriers would
become a thing of the past.

Comparison of VAT to Other Taxes
The question of whether the United States should have a VAT
should be considered within the different circumstances under
which such a VAT might be imposed. That is, should VAT re
place or supplement the federal corporate income tax, the federal
individual income tax, the employment taxes, property taxes, or
excise taxes? Furthermore, were VAT to be imposed, would it be
as a retail sales tax rather than as a levy in its more usual form, or
would it be collected as a direct tax on business? By considering
VAT in each of these contexts, specific advantages and disad
vantages become more apparent.
VAT vs. the Federal Corporate Income Tax

It is unlikely that VAT (as an indirect tax) would ever be sub
stituted entirely for a federal corporate income tax. Thus, the
question of which is the “better” tax is largely academic. In com
paring the two types of taxes, the argument is usually advanced
that the corporate income tax is progressive whereas VAT is re
gressive. However, some point out that to the extent that cor
porate tax is shifted to the consumer, it is not progressive but
regressive and, therefore, no different from VAT. Unfortunately,
economists are divided on whether there is an actual forward
shifting of the corporate income tax. One exhaustive study says it
is shifted in its entirety, but other studies have questioned this
conclusion and taken issue with it on the matter of how much, if
any, corporate tax is shifted.
The more practical question might be whether any additional
corporate taxes resulting from an increase in the corporate in
come tax rate would be passed on to the consumer. One could
speculate about this, but clearly, if VAT were enacted, a shift
would appear more likely, so that the greater part of the tax in
crease would probably be passed on to the consumer. However,
if the proceeds of VAT were spent to provide services for the
people taxed, in the same or in a greater proportion than the tax
is collected from them, the regressive affect would be obviated.
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It has also been said that there is really no comparison between
VAT and the corporate income tax. The VAT base is so much
broader than the corporate income tax base that, if substantial
additional revenues were needed, there would be little question
about where they might best be raised. For example, the base for
the corporate income tax in 1974 was $105 billion (estimated)
yielding a corporate income tax of $39 billion. The base for VAT
could vary from 500 billion to one trillion dollars, depending on
what is exempted. A 10 percent VAT could, therefore, yield from
50 billion to 100 billion dollars. And, a 15 percent VAT would
yield half again those amounts. Of course, there is no present
intention to raise such vast sums by means of VAT, but the
figures illustrate the revenue potential. For some, this very po
tential raises the question of whether VAT, once introduced,
would not be too extensive a source of governmental funds.
The very much larger base illustrates another point—all busi
ness would contribute to VAT collections while all do not now
contribute to income tax collections. The marginal producer
would have to shoulder a VAT tax “burden” while he can be said
to be protected now from this burden because his taxable income
is minimal.
With all transactions subject to tax, there is little opportunity
for tax planning. For this reason, VAT has been considered a
more neutral tax in that it can rarely affect business decisions in
the way an income tax can. In addition, because it is not levied
against income, it is also held to be far more neutral in its effect
on capital formation.
Taking these various points, it seems clear that there may well
be a place for VAT (or some other form of sales tax) as a com
plement to the federal corporate income tax system. While there
are a number of unresolved questions (principally the difference
in regression between a VAT and the corporate income tax),
VAT has certain admitted features which make it worth con
sidering as a complementary tax on business.
VAT vs. the Federal Individual Income Tax

Of all taxes levied by the federal government, the personal in
come tax yields the greatest revenue. Its progressivity and suc
cessful self-assessment procedure have been matters of pride
among many American economists and tax administrators. The
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likelihood of its ever being completely replaced by a VAT is
practically nil. Nor is it likely that VAT would be used to reduce
the personal income tax rates because of its apparent regressive
nature, certainly when compared to the progressive individual in
come tax rate structure. Although VAT may be made less re
gressive by special rates, credits, exemptions, and rebates (and
probably would have to be if introduced in the United States),
such features would make it administratively more complex.
In summary, a VAT as even a partial substitute for the federal
individual income tax system appears unwarranted. If VAT were
adopted because of its favorable effects on business, certain fea
tures of the present income tax system might require modifica
tion so as to improve the system’s progressivity ( higher minimum
tax, less “preferential” income excluded, change in capital gains
taxation, and so forth).
VAT vs. Other Indirect Taxes

E m ploym en t Taxes. Both a VAT and the social security tax on
employees’ wages are regressive in that they fall more heavily, as
a percentage of income, on the lower-income group than they do
on those with higher incomes. On the surface, it may appear that
the VAT is a more regressive tax; however, since employers now
pay one-half the social security taxes, there seems little doubt
that this cost, too, is passed on to the consumer. Thus, there
would appear to be no difference between the two regarding who
bears the ultimate tax burden.
The total amount of social security taxes collected in 1973 was
$55 billion. This means that a VAT would have to be levied in
the 9 percent range if an equal amount of revenue were to be
collected. VAT need not be entirely substituted for social se
curity taxes; however, as benefits are increased, an alternative
source for funding them will have to be found, and, as an al
ternative, VAT might be appropriate.
Property Taxes. In January, 1972, then President Nixon raised
specific questions about the present system of property taxes as
levied by the state and local governments. One reason for ques
tioning the system was the appearance of the “Serrano” type
decisions holding that local financing of education by the present
system of property taxes is unconstitutional. While a commission
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appointed to study the question has concluded that property tax
relief is not generally justified and, thus, VAT would not be an
appropriate substitute at this time, the effort to switch from the
traditional source of financing of public education ( as in the fore
going case of social security benefits) has to require a more thor
ough analysis of VAT as an alternative in this context. Even after
modification, it is doubtful that the income taxes, personal or
corporate, could carry the full burden if the aim was to signifi
cantly lower property taxes.
Excise Taxes. There would be little advantage in replacing the
present federal excise taxes with a value-added tax. The system
of tax collection on alcohol, tobacco, utilities, and so forth works
extremely well with a minimum of administrative problems for
taxpayers or the government. In fact, this very ease of collection
of over $16 billi o n annually apparently helps to tip the balance in
favor of retaining excise taxes each time they are due to expire.3
The trend is toward user taxes to support such conveniences as
highways and airport facilities. The taxes on alcohol, tobacco,
and gasoline perhaps also act as a deterrent to excess consump
tion, with some social benefits.
VAT v$. Retail Sales Tax

Both the VAT imposed in Europe and the retail sales tax are
forms of consumption tax, but the literature comparing a VAT
to a retail tax is surprisingly sparse—surprising because in the
United States, we probably have had more experience with the
retail sales tax than any other country, and it is natural to com
pare a VAT and a retail sales tax.
As to comparisons between the VAT and the retail sales tax
(R S T ), the volume. W hat You Should Know A bout the Value
A dded Tax,4 has this to say:
1. A VAT system involves many more tax returns than an RST
system. (This is the only disadvantage, the rest are all advan
tages or are neutral.)
3 See Exhibit 14, p. 58.
4 D. T. Smith, J. B. Webber, C. M. Cerf, What You Should Know About
The Value Added Tax (Homewood, Ill.: Dow Jones, 1973).

39

2. A VAT tends to cover the service sector of the economy
more broadly than the RST.
3. Neither the consumption VAT nor the RST is a tax deterrent
to capital expenditures.
4. A VAT is simpler in operation for commercial customers: it
does not require resale certificates or exemption certificates, for
example.
5. A VAT, since it is collected at every stage, is easier to enforce
than an RST.
6. The VAT is completely rebated on exports, whereas under an
RST, a portion of the sales tax on supplies, for example, may not
be rebated or arbitrary allotments input may need to be used.
These advantages are listed by other writers on the subject and
one is hard put to list any more. In the United States one could
argue that the RST should be reserved to the states, and if a
consumption tax is imposed by the federal government it should
be some other type, such as the VAT. This argument has some
political basis; but then other questions arise, such as, Should the
VAT be imposed at the retail level? If it is not, would this lead
to the end of independent wholesalers and retailers? If both taxes
are imposed, the problem of coordinating them arises.
Moreover, if a VAT is not imposed at the retail level would
the VAT be more simply imposed under the subtraction or addi
tion method rather than the invoice method. The experience of
Michigan’s BAT would have some bearing here. At the time of
its demise, the Michigan BAT was working well. However, where
either the addition or subtraction method is used, one could well
ask why not use the income tax that is already in existence, re
move some of its deductions, and, in effect, move toward a VAT.
This elasticity of a VAT makes it a phenomenon among taxes. On
one extreme (subtraction method) it is an income tax, on the
other (invoice method) it is a sales tax.
Not one of these advantages clearly demonstrates that a VAT
is superior to any retail sales tax currently in operation. Never
theless, in a nation that taxes its citizens at various levels of gov
ernment (e.g., state and federal) it may be politically feasible to
reserve one type of indirect tax to one level and another type to
another level. It would appear, however, that the imposition of a
single indirect tax can be much more efficient than the impo
sition of two different, broad-based consumption taxes.
40

3
Conclusions and Observations
Since the value-added tax first began to be discussed with some
seriousness as a potential addition to the taxing system of this
country, a number of developments have occurred that, taken
together, would seem to give added support to the push for
greater reliance on an indirect tax in the United States. There
appear to be three principal developments.
First, one of the most significant trading areas with which the
United States must compete is an enlarged Common Market, all
nine members of which now have operating VAT systems. For
whatever reason, many industrialized countries are placing grow
ing reliance on an indirect tax system. The United States com
petes for world markets with these countries, and to the extent
its exported goods bear hidden cost for income taxes while the
exported goods of other countries have been relieved of an in
direct tax cost through the normal operation of the VAT system,
U.S. goods may be placed at a disadvantage. If the U.S. corporate
income tax rates were increased, or the income tax base broad
ened, any existing disparity (see Exhibit 9) would simply be
increased.
Second, the need for additional tax revenues in the United
States is persistent. While either through reform or an increase
in rates, it is possible that the income tax system can be used to
meet this need, there remains the fundamental question of how
much additional income tax can really be collected without
severe distortion of the existing tax base. Clearly, the corporate
income tax is a limited source, so that, without an alternative to
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it, already burdensome individual income taxes must contribute
the greatest share.
Third, added to the need for additional revenue, is the growing
call for less reliance on certain taxes that have traditionally been
imposed: namely, the social security tax and real property tax
systems. Both are regressive and both have climbed materially
over the past several years. In fact, VAT may have gained cer
tain adherents from among its former critics as a result of the
growth of these taxes.
As a result of the foregoing, it would seem that imposition of
an indirect tax at the federal level merits serious consideration.
This does not necessarily mean that a traditional VAT should be
recommended for the United States; admittedly, many of the
reasons that dictated a VAT system for the Common Market are
inapplicable in the United States. However, a federally adminis
tered retail sales tax system might well be an appropriate source
for U.S. revenue requirements. A retail sales tax is already
familiar; it is imposed by most states and, properly modified,
would appear to accomplish all of the objectives of a VAT.
The last point should be carefully noted. Retail sales and use
taxes collected by the states do not at present begin to accom
plish the objectives of a national VAT system. They are not uni
versally utilized; there are important exceptions to their applica
tion, particularly with respect to services; the rates differ as do
exemptions; and, most importantly, they are not a source of fed
eral revenue. Nevertheless, a federally administered retail sales
tax system could be devised to cover all these points, and if such
a system were designed, it might well substitute fully and ade
quately for a federal VAT.
In all probability, the retail trade will not favor this alternative
to a traditional VAT. Although retailers will collect no different
an amount from customers under one system or the other, the full
effect of a federal sales tax will fall on their sales volumes. To the
extent such a tax is absorbed by the seller, the retailer will bear
the entire collection burden, whereas under a VAT system, pro
ducers earlier in the chain of distribution will have had to con
sider the effect of the tax on their sales price and thus may have
shared in absorbing some of the economic impacts of the tax. A
retail sales tax also requires the government to rely entirely on
this one group for its indirect tax revenues. Within a retail sales
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tax system, revenue is collected later and usually at a lower rate
than it is within a VAT system; a retail sales tax system could
leave too large an amount to be collected at the end of the chain
and too large a possibility for evasion at this one level.
If for these and other reasons it is determined that a federal
retail sales tax is not feasible, and a federal VAT is introduced, it
should conform as closely as possible to the classical system. Any
U.S. VAT system should be of the consumption type covering cap
ital purchases. There should be as few exceptions as possible,
with reliance on zero rating rather than exemptions where relief
is necessary. Ideally there should be a single rate. From a polit
ical standpoint, if VAT is introduced into the United States (or,
for that matter, a federal retail sales tax), the worst features of
regression would probably have to be curbed by credits, rebates,
and so forth. The low-income groups would have to be given
relief, even if the additional revenues generated by the tax were
intended to finance social benefits of which they would receive
the greatest share.
An important aspect of introducing a federal VAT or retail
sales tax is the effect on the state retail sales tax systems. Pre
sumably VAT could be administered as a separate system more
easily than a federal retail sales tax, but it is also clear that the
existence of two such tax systems side by side could be un
desirable. Already, there is considerable support for “piggy
backing” state income taxes and grafting them onto the federal
system for collection and administration. Ideally, the federal gov
ernment could collect all VAT or retail sales taxes and remit a
predetermined portion to each state. In fact, a VAT system
might permit the federal government to remit revenue to the
states where value was in fact added, rather than simply to the
states where the final retail sale took place, as would be the case
under the traditional sales tax setup. Obviously, such a single
system would require a nationwide rate if either a VAT system or
a federal retail sales tax system were adopted. While this would
appear to encroach upon the right of the states to determine tax
rates locally, the present trend toward revenue sharing promises
to have much the same long-term effect. The tendency, then,
would be to harmonize transaction taxes as levied by the various
states and thus to remove some of the inequities that exist be
tween the various states and that continue to affect interstate
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commerce. The point can be made that if Europe can harmonize
its tax systems within the Common Market, the United States
can certainly accomplish the same sort of internal harmonization
with considerable overall benefit to business.
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188,391

208,650

232,226

264,932

1971

1972

1973

1974

118,952

103,246

94,737

86,230

38,619

36,152

32,166

26,785

76,780

64,542

53,914

48,578

Social
Insurance
Corporation Taxes and
Incom e Taxes Contributions

Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin (July 1975).

Total

Fiscal Year

Individual
Income
Taxes

( In millions of dollars)

16,844

16,260

15,477

16,614

Excise
Taxes

3,334

3,188

3,287

2,591

Customs

FED ERA L FISCAL OPERATIONS: RECEIPTS

5,035

4,917

5,436

3,735

5,368

3,921

3,633

3,858

Estate
and
Misc.
Gift Receipts

EXHIBIT I

46

Year
1955
1967
1968
1960
1969
1971
1973

Im posed

20
15
11
16
17.65
18
8

Standard

7
—
5.5
4
—2
6
—

Necessities

17.60
—
—
—
3-9
14
—

Special

1 Zero rates for this purpose have been considered exemptions.
2 In effect, certain reduced rates apply but the taxable base is reduced instead of the rate itself.

France
Denmark
Germany
Netherlands
Sweden
Belgium
United Kingdom

Country

Percentage Rate of Tax

VAT Rates in Certain Countries1

—2
25
25

33.33
—
—

Luxury

EXHIBIT 2
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Norway
Denmark
Sweden
Netherlands
Austria
Germany
France
Belgium
U.K.
Canada
Italy
U.S.
Switzerland
Japan

4
1
3
2
5
9
7
8
6
10
11
12
13
14

Corporation
1.14
.92
1.73
2.78
1.56
1.68
2.13
2.60
2.47
3.63
2.32
3.14
1.93
3.85

Individual
12.54
21.50
18.48
11.67
8.36
10.09
3.97
9.64
11.14
11.56
3.95
9.42
8.08
5.39

Taxes on Income

45.71
44.82
43.89
41.84
37.04
35.97
35.80
35.20
34.73
33.53
31.07
28.06
24.12
21.09
12.38
3.41
8.92
14.74
9.45
12.13
14.47
10.63
5.40
2.92
12.14
5.75
5.64
4.10
19.65
18.99
14.76
12.65
17.67
12.07
15.23
12.33
15.72
15.42

12.66
9.75
8.47
7.75

Total

Social
Security
Contribution

Consump
tion
Taxes

Source : Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries 1965-1972.

(1972).

* These revenues are broken down into types of taxes and ranked according to total gross national product collected in taxes

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Country

1971 1972

Rank

Tax Revenues as a Percentage of Gross National Product*
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Denmark
Sweden
Canada
U.S.
Japan
Switzerland
U.K.
Belgium
Netherlands
Germany
Norway
Austria
Italy
France

Country

49.9
46.0
45.3
44.8
43.8
41.5
39.2
34.9
34.6
32.8
29.9
26.8
20.1
17.0

Total

47.9
42.1
34.5
33.6
25.5
33.5
32.1
27.4
27.9
28.1
27.4
22.6
12.7
11.1

Individual

2.0
3.9
10.8
11.2
18.3
8.0
7.1
7.5
6.7
4.7
2.5
4.2
7.4
5.9

Corporation

* These percentages are ranked according to dependence on income taxes (1 9 7 2 ).
Source : Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries 1965-1972.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Rank

Taxes on Income

26.3
28.6
31.9
26.7
28.7
39.9
36.9
34.0
36.2

21.8

36.3
30.0
32.5
19.3

Consump 
tion
Taxes

1.8
1.9
1.0
1.3

2.5

1.8

.1
10.5
13.2
4.9
5.7
11.1

4.5

7.7
20.3
8.7
20.5
19.4
23.4
15.6
30.2
35.2
33.7
27.1
25.5
39.1
40.4

Taxes on
Net Wealth and Social
Security
Immovable
Property
Contributions

Percentage of Total Revenue Collected From Each Type of Tax*

EXHIBIT 4
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300

500

Wholesaler sells to
retailer

Retailer sells to
consumer

* Value-Added Rate at 10%.

$ 0

100

200

$300

Value Added
by Seller

Purchases
by Seller

Manufacturer sells
to wholesaler

(2)

(1)

600

500

$300

Sales
Price
(Col. 1 plus 2)

(3)

( 50)

( 30 )

($ 0)

VAT
Credit

(5)

$60

10

20

$30

(6)
Payment
to Gov’t.
by Seller
(Col. 4 minus 5)

Total Value-Added Tax Collection

60

50

$30

(4)
Cumulative
VAT
(Col. 3 times
VA T Rate*)

Consumption Expenditure

EXHIBIT 5
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500

Retailer sells to
consumer

1 Value-Added Rate at 10%.
2 Reduced Value-Added Rate at 9%.

300

$ 0

100

200

$300

Value Added
by Seller

Purchases
by Seller

Wholesaler sells to
retailer

Manufacturer sells
to wholesaler

(2)

(1)

600

500

$300

Sales
Price
(Col. 1 plus 2)

(3)

(45)

(30)

($0)

VAT
Credit

(5)

$60

15

15

$30

(6)
Payment
to Gov't.
by Seller
(Col. 4 minus 5)

Total Value-Added Tax Collection

601

452

$301

(4)
Cumulative
VAT
(Col. 3 times
VAT Rate)

Reduced Rate at Wholesale Level

EXHIBIT 6
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500

Retailer sells to
consumer

1Value-Added Rate at 10% .
2Reduced Value-Added Rate at 9% .

300

Wholesaler sells to
retailer

100

200

$300

Value Added
by Seller

Purchases
by Seller

Manufacturer sells to
wholesaler
$ 0

(2)

(1)

600

500

$300

Sales
Price
(Col. 1 plus 2)

(3)

(50)

(30)

($0)

VAT
Credit

(5)

$54

4

20

$30

(6)
Payment
to Govt.
by Seller
(Col. 4 minus 5)

Total Value-Added Tax Collection

542

501

$301

(4)
Cumulative
VAT
(Col. 3 times
VAT Rate)

Reduced Rate at Retail Level

EXHIBIT 7

EXHIBIT 8

Eff ects of an Exempt Sale at
Wholesale and Retail Levels*
All Sales
Taxable

Exempt
Wholesaler

Exempt
Retailer

Manufacturer sells
to wholesaler:
Sales price
VAT at 10%

100
10

100
10

100
10

Total cost

110

110

110

110
( 10)
100

110
—
100

110
( 10)
100

Sales price
VAT at 10%

200
20

210
—

200
20

Total cost

220

210

220

220
( 20)
200

210
—
200

220

Sales price
VAT at 10%

400
40

410
41

420
—

Total cost

440

451

420

Wholesaler sells to
retailer;
Total cost
Prepaid VAT
Valued added

Retailer sells to
consumer;
Total cost
Prepaid VAT
Value added

—

200

* Comparison of situation where all sales in a cycle are subject to VAT with
result where:
1. An exempt sale occurs midway in the cycle.
2. An exempt sale occurs at the end of the cycle.
It is assumed that all maintained the same “value added” which would be
unlikely considering differences in efficiency and the effect of the tax cost
itself.
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EXHIBIT 9

Comparison of Export Sales in Third Countries
Exporter
o f the
United States
Selling price to customer in
Morocco

$150.00

Manufacturing cost
Insurance and freight
Duty (10% ad valorem)
Value-added tax paid out
Tax eliminated on export
Total expense
Net profit before tax
Income tax ( at 48%)

100.00
3.00
10.30
10.00
(10.00)

113.30

113.30

$ 19.08

53

$150.00

100.00
3.00
10.30
—0—

36.70
17.62

Net profit after tax

Exporter
o f a VAT
Country

36.70
14.68 ( a t 40%)
$ 22.02

EXHIBIT 10

Income Tax Base Calculation
Sales, net of returns and allowances
Cost of goods sold:
Beginning inventory
Purchases
Direct labor
Supplies, etc.
Total
Ending inventory

$

1, 000, 0001

$ 300,0002
200,0001
400,0002
100,0001
1,000,000
( 400,000)2

600,000
400,000

Gross profit
Salaries
Services, etc.
Supplies, etc.
Rent
Depreciation
Interest and taxes
Other deductions

100,0002
50,0001
50,0001
40,0002
30,0002
20,0002
10,0002

( 300,000)
100,000
50,0002

Net profit from operations
Royalties
Income tax base

$ 150,000

Income tax due at 48%

$

72,000

1Accounts utilized in determining VAT liability under either the invoice or
subtraction method.

2Accounts utilized in determining VAT liability under the addition method.
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EXHIBIT 11

V AT B ase C alcu lation — Invoice M ethod

Sales

$ 1 ,000,000

VAT collected at 15%
Purchases:
Raw materials
Manufacturing supplies
Office services
Office supplies
Capital purchase

$ 150,000
$200,000
100,000
50,000
50,000
400,000

Total

$800,000

VAT paid at 15%

120,000

VAT due

$

55

30,000

EXHIBIT 12
V A T B ase C alcu lation — Subtraction M ethod

Without Including VAT in Prices
$1,000,000

Sales
Purchases:
Raw materials
Manufacturing supplies
Off ice services
Office supplies
Capital purchase

$200,000
100,000
50,000
50,000
400,000

800,000

VAT base

$ 200,000

VAT due at 15%

$

VAT collected at 15% of $1,000,000
VAT paid at 15% of $800,000

$ 150,000
120,000

VAT due as above

$

30,000

30,000

Including VAT in Prices
Sales including VAT
Purchases including VAT

$1,150,000
920,000

VAT base

$ 230,000

VAT due at 13.04%

$

56

30,000

EXHIBIT 13

V A T B ase C alcu lation — Addition M ethod

Direct labor
Office salaries
Rent
Depreciation
Interest and taxes
Other deductions
Profit for income tax purposes

$ 400,000
100,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
150,000
750,000

Royalties
Capital purchase

$

50,000
400,000

450,000
300,000

Ending inventory
Beginning inventory

400,000
(300,000)

(100,000)

VAT base

$ 200,000

VAT due at 15%

$

VAT collected at 15% of $1,000,000
VAT paid at 15% of $800,000

$ 150,000
120,000

VAT due as above

$

57

30,000

30,000

58

4,247,542
1,437,058
600,711

109
1,310,435
98,937
654,366
145,927

6
1,360,489
93,204
838,537
-334,948

1974

4,308,071
1,506,824
843,959

197S

Source: Internal Revenue Service News Release IR-1435 (12/9/74).

Total excise taxes
Alcohol taxes, total
Tobacco taxes, total
Stamp taxes on documents, other
instruments and playing cards,
total
Manufacturers’ excise taxes, total
Retailers’ excise taxes, total
Miscellaneous excise taxes, total
Unclassified excise taxes

Source of Revenue

Quarter Ended June

( In thousands of dollars)

Summary for Quarter ended June 1974 and
fiscal year 1974 by source of revenue.

Internal Revenue Collections of Excise Taxes

44
5,395,750
368,372
3,041,507
340,181

16,572,318
5,149,513
2,276,951

1973

1974

287
5,742,154
416,244
3,154,037
1,648

17,109,853
5,358,477
2,437,005

Fiscal Year

EXHIBIT 14

